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Urinating on the Pennsylvania
Constitution? Drug Testing of High
School Athletes and Article I, Section 8
of the Pennsylvania Constitution
I.

Introduction

Monday is test day in a Middletown Area High School! At
11:00 a.m., the school principal is notified of the three students
randomly selected by computer to participate in the process! The
principal notifies the parents of the chosen few.' At about 1 p.m.,
Athletic Director Irv Strohecker visits the classroom of a selected
student.4 The student is pulled out of class by Mr. Strohecker and
taken across the street to the Family Medical Center After the
student presents identification, she walks with a technician and a
school district staff person to the testing room.6 The student must
then produce a urine sample After collecting her urine in a sterile
container, the student is taken back to school. A student that
refuses to do so is disqualified from participation in athletic
activities and treated as though he or she had failed the drug test.9

1. See Angela P. Swinson, Steel-High To Make Drug Testing a Must,
May 7, 1998, at Al.
2. See Middletown Area School District, Pa., Drug Testing for Student
Athletes Administration Procedure for Random Selection Process 1 (May 1997)
(unpublished supplement to school board policy on file with Dickinson Law
Review) [hereinafter Middletown Administrative Procedure].
3. See Swinson, supra note 1, at Al.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See Middletown Area School District, Pa., Protocol For Drug Testing
Student Athletes 1 (May 1997) (unpublished supplement to school board policy on
file with Dickinson Law Review) [hereinafter Middletown Protocol for Drug
Testing].
7. See id.
8. See id. at 1-2.
9. See Middletown Area School District, Pa., Drug Testing for Student
Athletes Board Policy § 227.3 (May 19, 1997) (policy on file with Dickinson Law
Review) [hereinafter Middletown Policy].
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In 1996, Middletown Area School District, located in central
Pennsylvania, became the first in its area to test its athletes for
drugs.' ° Many Pennsylvania area school districts are joining
Middletown in requiring student athletes to undergo mandatory
random drug testing."
The Pennsylvania School Boards
Association (PSBA) estimates that fifteen to twenty-five districts
across the state have such policies. 2 Recently, some school districts
have considered expanding their programs to test all students
involved in extracurricular activities. 3

Both the United States Supreme Court and the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court view the forcing of an individual to urinate in order
to test for drugs as a search of the individual. 4 The United States

Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution 5 permits school districts to randomly search
high school athletes without cause through drug testing. 16 Even

though student athletes lack federal protection from suspicionless
searches of their bodily fluids, shelter maybe available for

Pennsylvania's students under the Commonwealth's constitution.
Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution"' has been
10. See Swinson, supra note 1, at Al.
11. Telephone Interview with Davelyn Smeltzer, Policy Consultant,
Pennsylvania School Boards Association (Sept. 29, 1998) [hereinafter Smeltzer
interview].
12. See id. This estimate does not include districts that have drug testing
policies but who are not registered with PSBA nor does it include districts that test
the entire student body. See id.
13. See Larry Alexander, Hempfield Still Drafting Drug Policy,
INTELLIGENCER J., Dec. 9, 1998, at Al; Jane Zemel, District Schools Weigh
Expanded Drug Testing, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 6,1998, at A10.
14. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995);
Commonwealth v. McFarren, 525 A.2d 1185, 1188 (Pa. 1987).
15. The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16. See Acton, 515 U.S. 646. In the fall of 1998, the Court refused to grant
certiorari in a case involving a school district that tested all students involved in
extracurricular activities for drugs. See Todd v. Rush County Schs., 139 F.3d 571
(7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied., 525 U.S. 824 (1998). Last year, the Court refused to
grant certiorari in a case in which a high school's policy required all students who
were suspended for fighting to be tested for drugs. See Anderson Community Sch.
v. Willis by Willis, 158 F.3d 415 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1254 (1999).
17. Article I, Section 8 reads:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to
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extended to offer more protection of privacy rights than the Fourth
Amendment in the search and seizure context. 8
Although,
Pennsylvania courts have not addressed the issue of drug testing in
area high schools, an examination of the Commonwealth's search
and seizure provision indicates that such drug testing is
unconstitutional.
This Comment asserts that drug testing policies fail to pass
Pennsylvania constitutional muster. The focus is directed toward
mandatory suspicionless testing of student athletes, an activity that
schools have adopted in response to increased drug use in recent
years.' 9 Part II discusses a typical drug test performed by a school
district and refers to policies from Derry, Fairfield, and Middletown
Area School Districts. Part III analyzes the constitutionality of
drug testing policies under Article I, Section 8. Part IV discusses
alternatives to mandatory suspicionless drug testing of athletes that
would effectuate school boards' goals of maintaining a drug-free
environment without violating students' constitutional rights.
Finally, Part V concludes that mandatory random drug testing of
high school athletes is unconstitutional under Article I, Section 8 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution.
II.

Drug Testing Policies in Pennsylvania School Districts

Several types of drug testing polices exist in school districts
across Pennsylvania." This part will examine the purpose and

search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without
describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
PA. CONST. art. I, §8.
18. See Seth F. Kreimer, The Right to Privacy in the Pennsylvania Constitution,
3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 77, 81-82 (1993).

19. See John Gibeaut, Seeking Substances, 84-May A.B.A. J. 42 (1998).
20. Some districts in western Pennsylvania that test athletes include Avella,
Belle Vernon, Carlynton, Derry, and Iroquois. See Smelter interview, supra note
11. Midstate districts that test students for drugs include Danville, Fairfield,
Gettysburg, Halifax, Keystone Central, Middletown, Steelton-Highspire, and
Williamsport. See Steve Justice, P-O To Consider Voluntary Drug Testing
Program, CENTER DAILY TIMES, January 27, 1997, at A10; Angela P. Swinson,
Schools Look At Policies On Tests, THE HARRISBURG PATRIOT, January 5, 1999,
at Al; Swinson, supra note 1, at Al; Letter from Pam Kolega, Program Advisor of
Student Assistance Program and Technical Advisor to Safe and Drug Free
Schools, Pennsylvania Department of Education (October 9, 1998) (on file with
Dickinson Law Review); Smeltzer interview, supra note 11. Districts in eastern
Pennsylvania with drug testing policies include Boyertown, Pottstown, and Chester
Upland. See Dan Hardy, Chester High's Drug Policy Puts Footfall on New Turf,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, September 5, 1997, at Al.
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procedures for testing student athletes. In addition, the consequences for a student who fails a drug test will be explained.
A.

Drug Testing Policies in Pennsylvania

Three different types of policies appear to be in effect for the
purpose of testing students for drugs in Pennsylvania schools.' One
type of policy requires mandatory random testing of student
athletes." Other policies provide for voluntary testing of students.23
The third type of policy calls for testing of a student if there is a
reasonable suspicion that the student is under the influence of
drugs.24
B. Purpose of Policies
Pennsylvania school districts state that the purpose of testing
athletes for drugs is preventative not punitive.25 School districts test
athletes to promote a safe and healthy environment, not only for
the athletes on the playing field,26 but for all students." Through
testing, districts also seek to identify those students with substance
8
abuse problems so as to assist them with treatment programs.
C. Random Mandatory Drug Testing of High School Athletes
Drug testing procedures are similar throughout the various
school districts in Pennsylvania.29 Some school districts condition
21. See generally Carlynton School District, Pa., Drug and Alcohol Abuse
Policy § 227 (revised June 21, 1997) (policy on file with Dickinson Law Review)
[hereinafter Carlynton Policy]; Hardy, supra note 20, at Al; Swinson, supra note 1,
at Al; Justice, supra note 20, at A10.
22. See Middletown Policy, supra note 9, at 1; Hardy, supra note 20, at Al;
Swinson, supra note 1, at Al.
23. See Justice, supra note 20, at A10.
24. See Carlynton Policy, supra note 21, at 6.
25. See Derry Area School District, Pa., Student Athlete/Cheerleader Drug
Policy 1 (Sept. 9, 1998) (policy on file with Dickinson Law Review) [hereinafter
Derry Policy]; Middletown Policy, supra note 9, at 1; Hardy, supra note 20, at Al.
26. See Middletown Policy, supra note 9, at 1. "Administrators, teachers, and
coaches recognize that drugs have a deleterious effect on motivation, memory,
judgment, reaction time, coordination, and performance." Id.
27. See id.; see also Fairfield Area School District, Pa., Drug Screening of
Athletes § 6615 (August 5, 1996) (policy on file with Dickinson Law Review)
(stating that the purpose of drug testing is to identify those who risk jeopardizing
their own or others' health and safety) [hereinafter Fairfield Policy].
28. See Derry Policy, supra note 25, at 1; Hardy, supra note 20, at Al.
29. See generally Carlynton Policy, supra note 21; Derry Policy, supra note 25;
Fairfield Policy, supra note 27; Middletown Policy, supra note 9; Justice, supra
note 20, at A10.
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participation in athletic programs upon consent to drug testing at
the beginning of each season)0 Typically, a district randomly selects
athletes for testing each week throughout the athletic season by
Selection is made from the entire athletic team,
computer.
the student has
whether
regardless of
already been tested that season. 2 Once selected, a student who
refuses to be tested is treated as if he or she had tested positive for
drugs.33
Middletown Area School District's procedure, discussed at the
beginning this Comment, provides a typical example of how drug
testing is carried out in many Pennsylvania school districts.34 Like
Middletown, school districts usually have outside companies
conduct the testing.33 These companies are required to follow

procedures to ensure that the student's urine specimen is not
contaminated or substituted.36
If the test result indicates the presence of illegal or banned
substances,37 the positive result is verified.3" Once verification of the
30. See Derry Policy, supra note 25, at 2; Fairfield Policy, supra note 27, at
§ 6615.1; Middletown Policy, supra note 9, at 1.
31. See supra text accompanying note 2; Derry Policy, supra note 25, at 3;
Middletown Administrative Procedure, supra note 2, at 1.
32. See Middletown Administrative Procedure, supra note 2, at 1.
33. See Derry Policy, supra note 25, at 2; Middletown Policy, supra note 9, at 3.
34. See supra text accompanying notes 1-9.
35. See Derry Policy, supra note 25, at 2; Middletown Policy, supra note 9, at 3;
Swinson, supra note 1, at Al.
36. See Derry Policy, supra note 25, at 3 (extra clothing and bags must be left
outside of the testing area, a custody control form must be completed, a
temperature sticker must be affixed to the urine bottle, a bluing agent is added to
water in toilet or urinal, a monitor stands outside the stall or near the urinal, and
the urine bottle is capped and initialed by a lab employee); Fairfield Policy, supra
note 27, at §§ 6615.3-6615.4 (student chooses specimen container, assigned same
gender observer who observes the entire process, and the specimen container is
sealed and labeled); Middletown Protocol for Drug Testing, supra note 6, at 1-2
(student must provide photo identification prior to testing, the temperature of the
urine specimen is recorded, the specimen container is double sealed, and a Chain
of Possession Drug Screening Form is completed).
37. In Middletown, a student's urine test is positive if it reveals marijuana,
phencyclidine hydrochloride (PCP), amphetamines, cocaine, opiates, or
barbiturates. See Middletown Policy, supra note 9, at 2. Derry has a more
expansive list of substances which will result in a positive test result. The list
includes: alcohol, barbiturates, LSD, methaqualone, phencyclidine hydrochloride
(PCP), amphetamines, benzodiazepines, marijuana metabolites, nicotine,
propoxyphene, anabolic steroids, cocaine metabolites, methadone, and opiates.
See Derry Policy, supra note 25, at 4.
3& See Fairfield Policy, supra note 27, at § 6615.5; Middletown Policy, supra
note 9, at 2. If the first specimen is positive then a second test is immediately
performed using a second urine specimen which was separated from the original
specimen. See Fairfield Policy, supra note 27, at § 6615.5; Middletown Policy,
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positive result is complete, the outside company notifies the school
principal. 9 The principal contacts the student's parents and may set

up a meeting. 0

The student is suspended from participation in

activities.4

athletic
The duration of the suspension depends upon
whether this is the student's first, second, or third offense. 2 The
student must also participate in a drug treatment program.4 '3 A

positive test result indicating drug use does not result in a
suspension or expulsion from school. 4 In addition, schools do not

send results to juvenile or criminal authorities absent a binding
subpoena or other legal process.4 ' Finally, before he or she may

participate in athletics again, the student must be re-tested, possibly
several times.46
III. Random Mandatory Drug Testing of Student Athletes Under

Article I, Section 8
In Commonwealth v. Edmunds, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court set forth four areas that must be considered during analysis
of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 47 Edmunds requires an
examination of "(1) the text of the Pennsylvania Constitutional
provision; (2) the history of the provision, including Pennsylvania
case law; (3) related case-law from other states; [and] (4) policy
considerations, including unique issues of state and local concern,
48
and applicability within modern Pennsylvania jurisprudence.
This methodology is employed throughout this Comment to
address the constitutionality of random, mandatory drug testing of
student athletes in Pennsylvania.

supra note 9, at 2.
39. See Derry Policy, supra note 25, at 5; Middletown Policy, supra note 9, at 1.
40. See Derry Policy, supra note 25, at 6; Middletown Policy, supra note 9, at 2.
41. See Derry Policy, supra note 25, at 7; Fairfield Policy, supra note 27, at
§ 6615.8; Middletown Policy, supra note 9, at 2.
42. See Fairfield Policy, supra note 27, at § 6615.9 (suspension from athletics
until student provides evidence of a negative test); Derry Policy, supra note 25, at
6-7 (for first offense the student may be suspended for the remainder of the season
and the next season for which he or she is eligible; for second offense student is
suspended for the remaining season and next season; for third offense student is
suspended for the duration of his or her career with the school district).
43. See Middletown Policy, supra note 9, at 2; see also Derry Policy, supra note
25, at 7 (participation optional).
44. See Derry Policy, supra note 25, at 7; Middletown Policy, supra note 9, at 3.
45. See Derry Policy, supra note 25, at 7.
46. See id.
47. See Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 (Pa. 1991).
48. Id.
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Text of Article I, Section 8

The first area of analysis of the Pennsylvania Constitution is an
examination of the text. 49 The text of Article I, Section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution is very similar to that of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.0
Both prohibit
unreasonable searches and seizures and both require probable
cause to obtain a warrant to search or seize. 1 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has stated that although the language of the search
and seizure provision in the federal Constitution reflects the
wording in the state constitution, "we are not bound to interpret the
two provisions as if they were mirror images, even where the text is
similar or identical."52 Pennsylvania courts have stated that the
meaning of Article I, Section 8 cannot be understood from its text,
but must be drawn from the provision's history throughout

Pennsylvania jurisprudence. 3
B.

History of Article I, Section 8

The second area of analysis of the Pennsylvania Constitution
centers around the history of the provision.54 Protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures existed in Pennsylvania's
Constitution ten years before the federal Constitution was adopted
and fifteen years before the addition of the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.55 Drafted during the American

Revolution,

Pennsylvania's

original

constitution56 reduced

to

writing legal and moral codes that had originated in William Penn's
charter of 1681."7 The original search and seizure provision was
49. See id.
50. Compare supra note 17 with supra note 15.
51. See id.
52. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895-896.
53. See Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350, 358 (Pa. 1998), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 833 (1998); Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 896; Commonwealth v. J.B., 719 A.2d 1058,
1064 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
54. See Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895.
55. See Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457, 466 (Pa. 1983).
56. Clause 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 reads:
The people have the right to hold themselves, their houses, papers, and
possessions free from search and seizure, and therefore warrants without
oaths or affirmations first made, affording sufficient foundation for them,
and whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded or required to
search suspected places, or to seize any person or persons, his or their
property, not particularly described, are contrary to the right and ought
not be granted.
Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 896.
57. See id. at 896. Professor Kreimer notes that in Pennsylvania's charter,
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reworded in 1790 to its current form as it appears in Article I,
Section 8, and it has remained virtually untouched for over two
hundred years."
Pennsylvania courts originally relied on Fourth Amendment
precedent in interpreting Article I, Section 8." In the last twenty
years, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized
the Pennsylvania Constitution as an alternative and independent
source of individual rights.6° When interpreting Article I, Section 8,
Pennsylvania courts have stated that the provision is tied to a strong
notion of the right to privacy.6' In some cases, Pennsylvania courts
have not completely rejected federal search and seizure doctrine
and have analyzed situations under both the Fourth Amendment
and Article I, Section 8.62 Sometimes the two provisions lead to the
same outcome resulting in uniform federal and state privacy rights.63
On other occasions, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has departed

William Penn referred to privacy as "the greatest Worldly Contents Men can
enjoy." Kreimer, supra note 18, at 118.
58. See Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 896; see also supra note 17. In 1873, the words
"subscribed to by the affiant" were added to the end of Article I, Section 8. The
change adds only that the oath or affirmation supporting a warrant must be
pledged to by the affiant. See Edmunds, 568 A.2d at 896.
59. See Kreimer, supra note 18, at 82.
60. See id. at 81; see also Sell, 470 A.2d at 467.
61. See Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350, 358 (Pa. 1998), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 833 (1998) ("It is undeniable that the notion of privacy implicit in Article I,
Section 8 is particularly strong in this Commonwealth."); Edmunds, 586 A.2d at
898 ("[A] steady line of case-law has evolved under the Pennsylvania Constitution
making clear that Article I, Section 8 is unshakably linked to a right of privacy in
this Commonwealth."); Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 535 A.2d 1035, 1042 (Pa. 1987)
("[T]he privacy interest guaranteed by the Article I, Section 8 must be accorded
great weight."); Sell, 470 A.2d at 467 ("[T]he survival of the language now
employed in Article I, Section 8 through over 200 years of profound change in
other areas demonstrates that the paramount concern for privacy first adopted as a
part of our organic law in 1776 continues to enjoy the mandate of the people of
this Commonwealth.").
62. See Kreimer, supra note 18, at 85. See generally 1996 PA. BAR INST.,
PRESERVING AND PROTECTING THE PROMISE OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS UNDER
ARTICLE I, SECTION 8 OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION 18 (1996) (PBI No.

1996-1207) (outlining cases where Pennsylvania courts have refused to interpret
Article I, Section 8 more broadly than the federal courts have interpreted the
Fourth Amendment) [hereinafter PRESERVING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS].
63. See Commonwealth v. Kohl, 615 A.2d 308 (Pa. 1992) (holding under both
the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8, that the blood tests of drivers
were unreasonable searches because no probable cause existed to believe that the
drivers were under the influence of drugs or alcohol); Commonwealth v. Gray, 503
A.2d 921 (Pa. 1985), as amended, (February 5, 1986) (adopting the federal totality
of circumstances test for determining the existence of probable cause based on
information from confidential informants in the analysis of Article I, Section 8 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution); see also Kreimer, supra note 18, at 85.
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from federal precedent and protected the right to privacy solely
under the commonwealth's constitution.'
The Pennsylvania Constitution protects citizens from both
individual and general searches conducted by government officials.65
Because drug testing is a general search of students,' this
subsection will examine the treatment of general searches under
Article I, Section 8. This subsection will also apply the test utilized
under Article I, Section 8 to determine the constitutionality of
random mandatory drug testing in high schools.
1. General Searches Are Permitted Under Article I, Section 8.The United States Supreme Court has held that the Fourth
Amendment does not require probable cause, reasonable suspicion,
or a warrant to conduct certain general searches of the population."
The Court has held that a general search is constitutional if the
state's interest in conducting the search outweighs the intrusion into
64. CompareCalifornia v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) (holding that pursuit
by police is not a seizure and items recovered from fleeing individuals may be
admitted into evidence), United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (after
balancing individual's privacy interest in luggage against the intrusiveness of a drug
sniff by police dogs stated that sniff is not a search), United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not require the
suppression of evidence seized by a police officer acting in good faith reliance
upon a warrant later found to be defective because of lack of probable cause), with
Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769 (Pa. 1996) (holding that pursuit by police is
a seizure and the contraband abandoned by the fleeing defendant had been
coerced), Commonwealth v. Johnston 530 A.2d 74 (Pa. 1987) (under Article I,
Section 8, a drug sniff by police dog of property is a search requiring articulable
reasonable suspicion prior to drug sniff), Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d
887, 896 (Pa. 1991) (discussing the concept that Article I, Section 8 does not
incorporate a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule). See generally
PRESERVING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, supra note 62, at 1 (outlining cases where the
Pennsylvania courts have interpreted Article I, Section 8 more broadly than the
federal courts have interpreted the Fourth Amendment).
65. An individualized search focuses on a particular individual or piece of
property. See Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350, 358 (Pa. 1998), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 833 (1998). General searches are conducted on large classifications of
people or property. See id. For example, the search conducted in Cass was a
general search because all 2,000 lockers in the school were examined. See id.
General searches are conducted without suspicion as to wrongdoing and without a
warrant. See generally Commonwealth v. Martin, 626 A.2d 556, 560 (Pa. 1993)
(probable cause or reasonable suspicion is required to search a particular
individual under Article I, Section 8); Cass, 709 A.2d 350 (balancing competing
concerns is necessary to determine if a general search is constitutional under
Article I, Section 8).
66. See Cass, 709 A.2d at 355.
67. See Michigan Dep't. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990)
(holding that the state's use of highway sobriety checkpoints does not violate the
Fourth Amendment); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976)
(holding that warrantless stops by the Border Patrol at fixed checkpoints does not
violate the Fourth Amendment).
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the privacy rights of those searched, and the search can reasonably
be said to advance the state's interest.' Pennsylvania courts also
have held that warrantless general searches are permissible under
Article I, Section 8.69 An examination of several general search
cases, including police roadblock situations and school-wide
searches, will present the Pennsylvania constitutional standard
through which to evaluate high school drug testing.
a. Police roadblock cases.- The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court approached the constitutionality of general searches in police
roadblocks under Article I, Section 8 in a fashion similar to that of
the United States Supreme Court. 0
In several cases, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not require the police to have
warrants or suspicion of wrongdoing in order to conduct the
roadblock searches. The court justified the general searches by
stating that the Commonwealth's interests in conducting the
roadblocks outweigh the intrusion into the individual drivers'
privacy."
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not enthusiastically
dispensed of the warrant and probable cause requirements for
searches in police roadblock situations under the Commonwealth's
constitution.73
The method of balancing interests to justify

roadblock searches was suggested by two justices in Commonwealth
v. Tarbert.74

Warrantless police roadblocks were approved five

68. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455; Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 556-62.
69. See Cass, 709 A.2d at 360; Commonwealth v. Blouse, 611 A.2d 1177, 1180
(Pa. 1992); Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 535 A.2d 1035, 1042 (Pa. 1987).
70. Compare Blouse, 611 A.2d at 1178 (holding that police roadblock set up to
detect license and equipment violations is reasonable and therefore constitutional
because the government's interest in promoting safe highways outweighed the
intrusion into drivers' privacy interests), Tarbert, 535 A.2d at 1042 (stating that
police roadblocks are constitutional under Article I, Section 8 after balancing the
state's interest in preventing drunk driving against the intrusion into driver's
privacy) with cases cited supra note 67.
71. See Blouse, 611 A.2d at 1178; Tarbert, 535 A.2d at 1043.
72. See id.
73. See generally Cass, 709 A.2d at 365; Blouse, 611 A.2d at 1181.
74. See Tarbert, 535 A.2d 1035. In Tarbert, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
addressed the issue of police roadblocks aimed at drunk-driving. See id. at 1035.
The court held that the roadblocks were illegal because the use of police power in
such operations exceeded statutory authority. See id. at 1045. However the
opinion of the court stated that such roadblocks were constitutional under Article
I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See id. at 1043. Only two justices,
Nix and McDermott, signed onto the opinion. See id. at 1035. Justice Flaherty
concurred without explanation. See id. Justice Zappala concurred in the result but
disagreed with the constitutional analysis of the court. See id. at 1045 (Zappala, J.,
concurring). Justice Papadakos concurred in the result but stated that the court
did not need to address the constitutional issue. See id. at 1047 (Papadakos, J.,
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years

later by

a splintered

Pennsylvania

Supreme

389

Court. 5

Although the court adopted a balancing test similar to that existing
required administrative
under federal law, the majority
required under federal
which
is
not
authorization of roadblocks,
law." Finally, several members of the court continue to voice their
objections to the exception to the probable cause requirement
carved out in the police roadblock cases." These justices state that
general searches lacking probable cause or reasonable suspicion do
The
not have any legitimacy under Article I, Section 8.78
Pennsylvania Supreme Court split again when it considered general
searches in public schools.9
b.

General searches in the schoolhouse.-The

Pennsylvania

Superior Court utilized a balancing of interests test to justify metaldetector scans and bag searches in high schools. 80 The court held
that the schools' interests outweigh the students' privacy interests.'
The searches were constitutional because the search was reasonably

related to the school's safety concerns and safeguards were present
to protect students' privacy rights.'
concurring). Justice Larsen dissented stating that the legislature could not restrict
such a legitimate exercise of police power. See id. (Larsen, J., dissenting).
75. See Blouse, 611 A.2d at 1177. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld
police roadblocks as constitutional under Article I, Section 8 after balancing the
Commonwealth's interests against the intrusion into the drivers' privacy rights. See
id. Only Justices Nix, Larsen, and McDermott signed onto the opinion. See id.
Justice Papadakos concurred though stated that he did so reluctantly out of fear
that the police would "get carried away and abuse their authority in such mass
detection efforts." Id. at 1181 (Papadakos, J., concurring). Justices Flaherty,
Zappala, and Cappy dissented disagreeing with the use of a balancing test under
Article I, Section 8. See id. at 1181-1184.
76. See Blouse, 611 A.2d at 1180; Kreimer, supra note 18, at 86. To be
conducted in a constitutionally acceptable manner, police roadblocks must be
authorized by a police administrator prior to carrying out the searches as well as
follow administrative orders as to how to conduct the searches. See Blouse, 611
A.2d at 1180.
77. See Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350, 365 (Pa. 1998) (Flaherty, C.J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 833 (1998).
78. See id.
79. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
80. See In re S.S., 680 A.2d 1172 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996); In re F.B., 658 A.2d
1378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995), affd 726 A.2d 361 (Pa. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.
613 (1999).
81. See In re S.S., 680 A.2d at 1176; In re F.B., 658 A.2d at 1382.
82. See In re S.S., 680 A.2d at 1173. The Superior Court stated that the
method used to search the students contained adequate safeguards to protect
privacy interests. See id. All students who entered the high school were lead into
the gymnasium. See id. Then, the students were scanned with metal detectors and
their belongings were patted down by a school employee. See id. If a suspicious
object is detected in the pat down of a student's coat or bag, the employee has his
supervisor act as a witness as the employee conducts a search of the belongings.
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Metal detector and bag searches for weapons were approved
by the Pennsylvania Superior Court without adequately analyzing
the ramifications under Article I, Section 8.83 The court upheld the
searches of students for weapons because of the high rate of
violence in the particular schools." The issue of whether general
searches could be justified by a school's interest in combating drug
use was not addressed until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
considered Commonwealth v. Cass.
In Commonwealth v. Cass, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
approved a general search of students' lockers for drugs by school
officials and police. 85 The principal of Vincent Cass' high school
feared that students were buying and selling drugs in the school."
Since the principal did not have any specific information
implicating any certain student, he organized a general search of all
2,000 lockers for drugs." School officials, accompanied by two
police officers, took a trained drug dog to each locker in the
building.' When the drug dog alerted to a particular locker, school
officials opened that locker and those immediately adjacent, and
searched inside the lockers."
Cass' locker was the only one
searched that contained drugs.'
In analyzing the search under the Fourth Amendment, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton. 91 The
Acton case upheld random mandatory drug testing of high school

See id.
83. In the case of In re S.S., the court held that the search did not violate the
United States or Commonwealth Constitutions. See In re S.S., 680 A.2d at 1176.
The court did not explain why the search was justified under the Pennsylvania
Constitution but merely followed the reasoning of In re F.B. in its analysis. See id.
In In re FB., the court refused to analyze the search under the Pennsylvania
Constitution because the appellant did not properly raise the state constitutional
issue in his brief. See In re F.B., 680 A.2d at 1382. In both cases, the court failed to
use the four prong methodology set forth in Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d
887 (Pa. 1991), to demonstrate why the searches are constitutional under Article I,
Section 8.
84. See In re S.S., 680 A.2d at 1176; In re F.B., 658 A.2d at 1382.
85. See Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350 (Pa. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
833 (1998).
86. See id. at 352.
87. See id. at 353.
88. See id. On the day of the search, students were kept in the classrooms,
unaware of the searches occurring in the halls. See id. at 352.
89. See id. at 352.
90. See Cass, 709 A.2d at 352. Cass was suspended from school and charged
with possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. See id. at 352-353.
91. See id. at 356; Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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athletes.'
Using a three prong test set forth in Acton, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the search in this case did
not offend the Fourth Amendment because: (1) a student possesses
a limited privacy interest in his or her school locker, (2) a drug dog
sniff is minimally intrusive, and (3) the search was a practical means
to effectuate the principal's "compelling concerns" over possible
drug use.
In analyzing the search under the Pennsylvania Constitution,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the applicability of the
reasoning set forth in Acton to Article I, Section 8." After
balancing the student's privacy right against the school's interest in
maintaining a safe school environment, the court stated that general
searches based upon neutral guidelines may be conducted with less
than reasonable suspicion.95 The court held that the privacy
interests of students in a school setting are entitled to no greater
protection under the Pennsylvania Constitution than the Fourth
Amendment."
For the majority in Cass, Justice Cappy justified general
searches of school lockers by relying on the police roadblock cases
as evidence of the "tolerance" of such searches under Pennsylvania
law.' Interestingly, Justice Cappy was opposed to the warrantless
general searches in the roadblock cases.9" In upholding general
searches of high school students under Article I, Section 8, Justice
Cappy refers to a past acceptance of general searches by the court
of which he played no part.? Also in Cass, as with the police
roadblock cases, three of the six justices strongly disagreed with the
use of a balancing test to justify a general search of students'
lockers under Article I, Section 8.1°° Therefore, when addressing
92- See Acton, 515 U.S. at 664-65.
93. See Cass, 709 A.2d at 357-358.
94. See id. at 358.
95. Cf. at 365. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that in order to be
constitutional, general searches must be conducted based upon neutral, clearly
articulated guidelines. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 360.
98. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
100. See Cass, 709 A.2d at 366-373. "I emphatically disagree with [the]
treatment of Pennsylvania law.... I take issue with the majority's reliance on
Talbert and Blouse, for [random police roadblocks do not] have any legitimacy
under Article I, Section 8.... This exception to the general requirement of
probable cause or reasonable suspicion swallows the entire prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures, and is, therefore, unconstitutional." Id. at 366
(Flaherty, C.J., concurring). Only six justices took part in the decision because
Justice Saylor did not participate.
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the constitutionality of drug testing, the court would probably

remain divided as to the wisdom of using a balancing test to justify
general searches under Article I, Section 8.101 Even if a majority of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided to apply the balancing
test to drug testing policies, the policies would be found to be
unconstitutional because the school's interests cannot outweigh the

intrusions upon the students' privacy rights.
2. Balancing Interests Does Not Justify Drug Testing.- General

searches in the school environment are constitutional under Article
I, Section 8 if based upon clearly articulated neutral guidelines and

the school's interests for the search outweigh the student's right to
privacy. 2 Most likely, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's mandate
that general searches be conducted based upon guidelines would be
satisfied by the formulation of written drug testing polices."
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court implies in
Commonwealth v. Cass that drug testing of high school athletes

does not violate the Pennsylvania Constitution, 0' 4 this Comment will
demonstrate that under Cass' own balancing test, drug testing
policies fail to pass constitutional muster. Drug testing cannot be
classified as a constitutionally acceptable search because the
school's interest in testing does not outweigh a student's privacy

rights.
a. School's interest in testing.-The

Pennsylvania Supreme

Court requires a school to have a compelling interest in order to
conduct a general search of its students.'9 For example, the
principal in Cass asserted that he initiated the search of all students'
lockers in order to address heightened drug activity in the school. 6
101. See id. at 365 (three justices in favor of applying the balancing test under
Article I, Section 8, three justices opposed to employing use of the balancing test,
and one justice did not participate in the consideration of the case);
Commonwealth v. Blouse, 611 A.2d 1177, 1180 (Pa. 1992) (four justices in favor of
applying the balancing test under Article I, Section 8 and three justices opposed to
applying the balancing test); Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 535 A.2d 1035, 1042 (Pa.
1987) (only two justices stated that they are in favor of using a balancing test under
Article I, Section 8).
102. See Cass, 708 A.2d at 365.
103. See Derry Policy, supra note 25, at 1; Fairfield Policy, supra note 27, at
§ 6615.1; Middletown Policy, supra note 9, at 1.
104. See Cass, 709 A.2d at 365. The court concluded that students were entitled
to no greater protection from a general search under Article I, Section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution than under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. See id. Because the decision involved a general search of
school lockers, arguably it does not apply to general searches of students' bodily
fluids.
105. See id. at 361.
106. See id. at 352. The principal offered several reasons for his suspicions of
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that "protecting students
from the dangers of drugs is certainly
a compelling and important
01 7
interest of the school district.',
School districts assert reasons similar to those presented by the
school in Cass for instituting random drug testing of athletes."8 It is
likely that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would recognize as
compelling a school district's interest in fighting the presence of
drugs within the school environment. However, the school districts
have not automatically tipped the scale in their favor by justifying
drug testing with a compelling reason. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has stated that even the war on drugs is not so compelling an
interest that an individual's rights may be annihilated.' "° Prior to
writing the majority opinion in Cass, which upheld suspicionless
searches of lockers because of the dangers of drugs, Justice Cappy
wrote the following about the drug dog sniff of an individual's body:
Much has been compromised in the name of the war on drugs.
But let it ring clear in Pennsylvania, no matter how well
intended or compelling the government interest in ridding
ourselves of the illicit drug trade, our unwavering belief in the
sanctity and integrity of personal privacy constrains us to
conclude that no citizen should be subjected to a governmental

intrusion of this nature. 110

Fighting the war on drugs was not a sufficient justification for
the search of an individual's outer-garments, without cause, through
the use of a drug detection dog."' The privacy interests implicated
by urinalysis are at least, if not more, weighty than a search of one's
clothing.
b. Student's privacy interest.-When balancing the Commonwealth's interest against an individual's rights, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has stated that the privacy interest guaranteed by
Article I, Section 8 must be accorded great weight.'
In a line of
cases involving school searches of individual students, the
increased drug activity in the school: information from students, observations of
suspicious activity (students passing packages among themselves in the halls,
students wearing beepers, students carrying large amounts of money, and students
increased use of the pay phones), increased use by students of drug counseling, and
calls from concerned parents. See id.
107. Id. at 361.
108. School districts' drug testing policies seek to eliminate drugs in the school
environment. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
109. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 626 A.2d 556, 561 (Pa. 1992).
110. Martin, 626 A.2d at 563 (Cappy, J., concurring).
111. See id. at 560.
112. See Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 535 A.2d 1035, 1042 (Pa. 1987).
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Pennsylvania Superior Court"3 required school officials to have
reasonable suspicion before searching a particular student in order
to protect the student's privacy and right to be free from

unreasonable searches and seizures." 4 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has also recognized students' right to privacy under the
Pennsylvania Constitution.15

Pennsylvania jurisprudence recognizes the intrusiveness of
urinalysis, but addresses the subject in only a few cases. Urinalysis
has been mentioned in opinions involving Pennsylvania's implied
consent law."6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that
urinalysis may be conducted only if there is probable cause to
believe that an individual was driving under the influence of alcohol
or a controlled substance." 7 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
113. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of the
appropriate standard for determining the constitutionality of an individual search
under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
114. See Commonwealth v. J.B., 719 A.2d 1058, 1064 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998)
(holding that under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,
individualized searches of public school students conducted by school officials are
subject to a reasonable suspicion standard). This is the same standard set forth by
the United States Supreme Court for individual searches of students under the
Fourth Amendment. See New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding that a
search of a student's purse by a school official was reasonable because it was based
upon reasonable suspicion that the student had been smoking in the bathroom);
see also In re S.K., 647 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (holding that the pat-down
of a student by a school security officer was reasonable because it was based upon
reasonable suspicion that the student was in possession of cigarettes); In re S.F.,
607 A.2d 793 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that the search of a student's pockets
by school police officer was based upon reasonable suspicion and was therefore
justified); In re Dumas, 515 A.2d 984 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (search of individual
student's locker by the assistant principal was not based upon reasonable suspicion
and was therefore unreasonable and invalid).
115. See Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350, 360 (Pa. 1998), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 833 (1998) ("[P]ublic school students do possess a privacy interest, albeit a
limited one, protected by the Pennsylvania Constitution.").
116. See Commonwealth v. Kohl, 615 A.2d 308 (Pa. 1992); Commonwealth v.
McFarren, 525 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1987). Under Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Code,
an individual consents to a breath, urine, or blood test if a police officer has
reasonable grounds to believe that the person has been operating a motor vehicle
under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1547(a) (West 1982).
117. See Kohl, 615 A.2d at 315; McFarren, 525 A.2d at 1188. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court refused to justify chemical testing by balancing the privacy
interests of the driver against the Commonwealth's interest in reducing drunk
driving. See Kohl, 615 A.2d 308; Kreimer, supra note 18, at 86. The court noted
that the Commonwealth had a compelling interest in protecting its citizens from
the dangers of drunk driving, however the protection afforded by Article I, Section
8 may not be diminished by the Commonwealth's vigilance in promoting that
interest. See Kohl, 615 A.2d at 316. The Superior Court also required probable
cause for chemical testing and refused to balance an individual's privacy interests
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also addressed drug testing of employees by a private employer." 8
While the decision appears to reflect the court's acceptance of
urinalysis as a non-intrusive search, the holding is limited to drug
testing of adults by a private, and not state, actor.1 9 The case does
not indicate how the court would address drug testing of high
school athletes.

Mandatory and suspicionless drug testing in high schools strays
from the trend in Pennsylvania law protecting the privacy and
integrity of an individual's body from state intrusion. For example,
when urged by the Commonwealth to expand the length of time
permitted for a Terry frisk and adopt a new category of seizure

called justifiable detention, the supreme court refused to do so.12
The court rejected the Commonwealth's "ends justify the means"
rationale and stated that the seriousness of the criminal activity
being investigated can never be used as a reason for abandoning the
constitutional right to be free from governmental intrusions into
personal privacy, absent reasonable suspicion or probable cause. '
In addition, under Pennsylvania law, an invasion of one's body is a
more severe intrusion of privacy rights than a search of one's

property.122

Therefore, although Commonwealth v. Cass allows

against the government's interest in conducting the search "given the high level of
intrusiveness" of urine and blood tests. See Commonwealth v. Danforth, 576 A.2d
1013, 1021 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
118. See Rebel v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 723 A.2d 156
(Pa. 1998) (denying unemployment benefits to an employee who refused to
comply with a drug test by his employer Duquesne Light). The court stated that
urinalysis did not unduly intrude on the employee's privacy interests because the
tests were conducted off the job site and in a "confidential and professional
manner." Id. at 160.
119. See id. at 159. Justice Zapalla in his concurring opinion stated, "this
decision has absolutely no ramifications with respect to... the protection against
unreasonable government intrusions provided by the state and federal
constitutions." See id. at 160-61 (Zapalla, J., concurring).
120. See Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 614 A.2d 1378, 1382 (Pa. 1992). A
Terry frisk allows an officer to search an individual based upon a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); In re
S.J., 713 A.2d 45 (Pa. 1998). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that
officers may not frisk an individual merely to protect their own safety, but must
have specific articulable facts establishing that an individual is armed and
dangerous before conducting a pat-down for weapons. See In re S.J., 713 A.2d at
48.
121. See Rodriquez, 614 A.2d at 1383. The court stated that the "serious ills
inflicted upon society by illegal narcotics" was not reason enough to ignore the
protection of an individual's privacy under Article I, Section 8. See id.
122. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 626 A.2d 556, 560 (Pa. 1993). A drug dog
sniff-search of property in Pennsylvania requires reasonable suspicion that drugs
are located in the place, see Commonwealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74 (Pa. 1987),
while a drug dog sniff-search of a person requires probable cause. See Martin, 626
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students' lockers to be searched without cause, the analysis cannot
be extended to permit the general search of students' bodies
through urinalysis.
Even though drug testing occurs in a controlled school setting,
the privacy interests of students in the bathroom must be afforded
great weight. 23' The intrusiveness of urinalysis is supported by many
sources, including Pennsylvania law."4 The school's interests in
testing are important, but are not sufficient to justify the invasions
of students' privacy. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has refused
to allow governmental interests such as eliminating illegal drugs
and abolishing drunk driving to outweigh an individual's right to be
free from government searches.'2 5 Therefore, the balance tips in
favor of the student's right to be free from a suspicionless search of
his or her bodily fluids.
C. Case Law From1 Sister
States Relating to Drug Testing of High
26
School Students.

The third area of analysis of the Pennsylvania Constitution
requires an examination of related case law from other states. 27 To
date, no state has heard a state constitutional challenge to
mandatory drug-testing of high school athletes. In Commonwealth
A.2d at 560. Once the sniff search of an individual has been conducted, any
additional search beyond a pat-down for weapons requires a warrant. See id.
123. When balancing the Commonwealth's interests against the individual's
rights, the privacy interest guaranteed by Article I, Section 8 must be given great
weight. See Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 535 A.2d 1035, 1042 (Pa. 1987).
124. See infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying
notes 116-117.
125. See supra notes 117 and 122. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
We are mindful that government has a compelling interest in eliminating
the flow of illegal drugs into our society, and we do not seek to frustrate
the effort to rid society of this scourge. But all things are not permissible
even in the pursuit of a compelling state interest. The [state] Constitution
does not cease to exist merely because the government interest is
compelling. A police state does not arise whenever crime gets out of
hand.
Commonwealth v. Martin, 626 A.2d 556, 560 (Pa. 1993).
126. When analyzing the holdings of other states, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has suggested that one should not focus on the number of states holding one
way or another. See Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769, 775 (Pa. 1996). The
Court has stated that one should look to the substance of the decisions to
determine why states have extended greater protection or have declined to offer
greater protection of rights under their own constitutions as compared to the
United States Constitution. See id. The court also feels that it is important to note
if other states express constitutional concerns similar to those of Pennsylvania. See
id.
127. See Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 (Pa. 1991).
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v. Cass, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court pointed to acceptance by
several states, under their own constitutions, of the United States
Supreme Court's holding in New Jersey v. T.L.O.'28 as an indication
that states would also accept the Supreme Court's approval of high
school drug testing in Vernonia School District47J v. Acton.'9 This
assumption fails to consider the differences between the searches
involved in T.L.O. and Acton. 30 Also, states that have approved of
general searches in schools under their constitutions have done so
when the searches involved student's property, and have not
indicated how they would rule on general searches of students'
bodies. 3 ' Finally, a recent decision by the Colorado Supreme Court
gives some indication that states may not be as tolerant of drug
testing as the United States Supreme Court was in Acton. 2
1. Acceptance of T.L.O. Does Not Indicate Acceptance of
Acton-Every jurisdiction that has considered TL.O. under its
own state constitution has adopted the Fourth Amendment
analysis.'
Assuming that the same result will occur when states are
faced with state constitutional challenges to mandatory drug testing
of high school athletes fails to recognize the differences between
T.L.O. and Acton. While T.L.O. involves the search of a particular
individual's property, Acton approves of random searches of
student athletes' bodily fluids.3
T.L.O. requires that a search of an
individual student, or his or her property, to be based upon

reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.'

Acton requires nothing

more than the good intentions of a school district to justify forcing

128. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment requires only reasonable suspicion of a school violation to search a
particular student's purse).
129. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (holding that
random mandatory urinalysis of student athletes is justified under the Fourth
Amendment because the school's interests in testing outweighs a student athlete's
expectation of privacy).
130. See infra text accompanying notes 135-36.
131. See State v. Barrett, 683 So.2d 331 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Isiah B. v. State,
500 N.W.2d 637 (Wis. 1993); Desilets v. Clearview Reg'l. Bd. of Educ., 627 A.2d
667 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
132. See Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1998).
133. See Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350, 362 (Pa. 1998), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 833 (1998).
134. Compare New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment requires only reasonable suspicion of a school violation to
search a particular individual) with Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646
(1995)(holding that random mandatory urinalysis of student athletes is justified
under the Fourth Amendment because the school's interests in testing outweighs a
student athlete's expectation of privacy).
135. See TL.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42.
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athletes to undergo chemical testing of their urine. 3 6 Because of
the differences between the two Fourth Amendment rules set forth
in these two cases, approval of a search based upon reasonable
suspicion under a state constitution does not indicate acceptance of
a search of all athletes' bodies without justification.
2. States Approve of General Searches of Students Under Their
Own Constitutions.-There are only three state courts, in addition
to Pennsylvania, that have addressed general searches of high
school students.'37 All three have ruled on cases involving general
searches of property in schools.'
None of these state courts have
indicated how they would rule if presented with challenges to high
school drug testing under their states' constitutions.
In State v. Barrett,the Court of Appeals of Louisiana examined
the general search of public school classrooms by drug dogs. 3 9 The
only search that the court addressed was that of students emptying
their pockets as they were leaving the classroom prior to the
entrance of the dogs. 4 ' The court held that requiring students to
empty their pockets was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
and Article I, Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution partly
because of the unobtrusive nature of the search.' The court in no
way indicated that by upholding the compulsion of a student to
empty his pockets, the compulsion of a student to empty his bladder
would be permissible under the state constitution.
In Isiah B. v. State, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld the
random searching of students' lockers by school officials under the
Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin
Constitution.'
The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that it
routinely conformed state law regarding search and seizure to
federal law.'43 The acceptance of federal search and seizure
doctrine by Wisconsin is not persuasive in a Pennsylvania

136. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 664-65.
137. See State v. Barrett, 683 So.2d 331 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Isiah B. v. State,
500 N.W.2d 637 (Wis. 1993); Desilets v. Clearview Reg'l. Bd. of Educ., 627 A.2d
667 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993). Pennsylvania addresses the general search of
students' lockers in Commonwealth v. Cass. See Cass, 709 A.2d 350.
138. See Barrett, 683 So.2d 331; Isiah B., 500 N.W.2d 637; Desilets, 627 A.2d 667.
139. See Barrett, 683 So.2d 331. During the searches, dogs sniffed students'
belongings and desks, however the students themselves were never individually
sniffed. See id. at 334.
140. See id. at 337.
141. See id. at 338.
142. See Isiah B., 500 N.W.2d at 638.
143. See id. at 646.
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constitutional analysis because Wisconsin law is less protective of
individual rights than is Pennsylvania law.1"
In Desilets v. Clearview Regional Board of Education, the New
Jersey Superior Court upheld the search of all students' hand
The students themselves
luggage prior to leaving for a field trip.'
did not believe that the
court
Jersey
New
The
searched.'
not
were
circumstances of this case required greater protection of students'
rights under Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution
than that provided by the Fourth Amendment.'47 The court stated
that student anxiety about the search was eliminated by prior
warning that the luggage would be searched, by searching all
students' bags, and by searching in the open.'" Also, the court
regarded the search as reasonable because students could avoid the
process by not bringing hand luggage on the trip.'49 The court never
indicated that New Jersey would accept Acton and general searches
of student athletes' urine."
3. State Court Struggles With Acton and Rejects Drug Testing
of the Marching Band.-A decision of the Colorado Supreme Court
shows that states may not be as tolerant of drug testing as the
United States Supreme Court was in Acton. 5' In Trinidad School
District No. 1 v. Lopez, the Colorado Supreme Court sitting en
banc held that drug testing of students in the marching band was
not reasonable and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. 52
While the court never addresses the matter under its state

144. The Wisconsin court in Isiah B. held that there was no constitutional
violation in the random locker searches because the students had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in their lockers. See id. at 650. This is contrary to what the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in Commonwealth v. Cass, "a student ...can
reasonably expect a measure of privacy within that locker." See Commonwealth v.
Cass, 709 A.2d 350, 359 (Pa. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 833 (1998). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court does not typically conform Article I, Section 8 to
federal law as does Wisconsin. See sources cited supra note 64. When considering
other jurisdictions' approaches to constitutional concerns, the persuasiveness of
the approaches depends upon whether other states express constitutional concerns
similar to those of Pennsylvania. See supra note 126.
145. See Desilets v. Clearview Regional Bd. Of Educ., 627 A.2d 667, 667 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
146. See id. at 668.
147. See id. at 673.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See Desilets, 627 A.2d at 667.
151. See Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095, 1107-10 (Colo.
1998).
152. See id. at 1110.
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constitution, the court demonstrates some hostility toward drug
testing of high school students.'3
The Colorado Supreme Court employed the analysis in Acton
and examined the nature of the privacy interest, the character of
the intrusion, and the governmental interest involved with drug
testing members of the marching band.'
The court questioned
Acton's analogy of urinalysis to the ordinary use of a rest room."'
The Colorado court had some difficulty labeling urinalysis as a
negligible intrusion. 56 Also, the court disagreed with the school
district's perception that Acton approved of implementing drug
57
testing of students, like band members, who are role models.
There was no evidence to suggest that band members had a greater
incidence of drug use than the student body as a whole, and no
evidence that band members risked injuring themselves or others
through drug use.15 The Colorado court found that student "role
models" could not be tested without evidence of a drug problem
among such students. 1 9
At present, it is not clear that states will adopt the United
States Supreme Court's acceptance of drug testing of high school
athletes.
Although state courts have adopted the Fourth
Amendment requirement of reasonable suspicion for individualized
searches under their own constitutions, a larger step is necessary to
approve of randomly subjecting students to urinalysis without any
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. The Colorado Supreme
Court's difficulty with one of the major points of Acton, that
153. See id. at 1108-1109.
154. See id. at 1105-10.
155. See id. at 1108. The court addressed the comparison of urinalysis to using
a public restroom:
Ordinarily, a student has some choice about when to use the rest room
and when to urinate. The fact that one student was not able to urinate
after several attempts because he was too embarrassed underscores this
point. Ordinarily, a student does not have an official monitor, a person
whose sole purpose is to prevent a student form altering the student's
urine sample, listening to (and perhaps watching from behind) the

student urinating. Ordinarily, a student does not have to urinate into
a container and present his or her urine sample to a school district
representative for temperature assessment, labeling, and preparation for
analysis. Ordinarily, a student urinates simply because the body requires
it, not because a school district insists that the student provide a urine
sample on demand in order for the school district to search it for the
presence of drugs.
Id.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See
See
See
See

Lopez, 963 P.2d at 1108.
id. at 1109.
id.
id.
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urinalysis is a negligible intrusion, may indicate that state courts will
stop following the United States Supreme Court when evaluating
drug testing under their own constitutions.
D. Policy Considerations
The final area of analysis of the Pennsylvania Constitution
focuses upon policy considerations, including unique issues of state
and local concern, and applicability within modern Pennsylvania
jurisprudence."6 Although drugs are a threat to children and their
education,"' three reasons justify the refusal of mandatory random
drug testing of student athletes in light of "Pennsylvania's
traditionally high regard for individual privacy. '' 112 First, the danger
of massive expansion of the drug testing program beyond that of
only athletes exists. Second, compulsive urinalysis has been
recognized as a very invasive procedure that has harmful effects on
children. Finally, drug testing programs aimed at athletes are not
designed to effectively combat the drug problems in schools, but
are structured according to the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Acton.
1. Danger of Expansion.-The possibilities of expanding the
drug testing policies appear limitless. The United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari in a case involving random drug testing of
students involved in extracurricular activities.' 63 In light of the
Court's refusal to address this issue, the expansion of drug testing
programs to all students involved in extracurricular activities has
already been contemplated by several school districts in
Pennsylvania.' 6' Students, parents, and board members seem more
receptive of a program that would test all students involved in
160.
161.

See Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 (Pa. 1991).
See Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350, 364 (Pa. 1998), cert. denied, 525

U.S. 833 (1998).
162. Id.
163. See Todd v. Rush County Schools, 139 F.3d 571, 571 (7th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 824 (1998); Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Lets Indiana Schools'
Drug Test Policy Stand, WASHINGTON POST, October 6, 1998, at A3.
164. See Alexander, supra note 13, at Al (students and administrators at
Hempfield High School in Lancaster, Pa. believe the policy they hope to adopt
should cover all students involved in extracurricular activities); Christine Schiavo,
Union Says Drug Tests Shouldn't Be Top Priority,ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL,
December 12, 1998, at B20 (School Board Director of Allentown School District
proposed a policy that would allow random drug testing of students in
extracurricular activities); Zemel, supra note 13, at A10 (school administrators in
Avella Area High School in Washington, Pa. are considering expanding their
current drug testing policy to cover any student involved in an extracurricular
activity).
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extracurricular activities as opposed to simply singling out
athletes."' The danger in expanding the programs to test all
students involved in extracurricular activities is that soon districts
may push to expand the program to all students.'6 School boards
may reason that testing the entire student body treats all students
equally and would not isolate those involved in school activities.
Students cannot look to the United States Supreme Court to
protect their right of privacy because the Court has failed to do so
thus far. Testing must be blocked by Article I, Section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution before all students are invaded.
Changing testing policies to include the entire student body is
only part of the expansion that may very well occur. A drug-free
school environment includes more than just students, and must
include teachers, administrators, bus drivers, coaches, custodial
workers, secretaries, and food service workers. Schools in other
parts of the country have attempted to test all people who enter the
schoolhouse.'67 At least one Pennsylvania school district may follow
this example. 168 Also, it is not unrealistic to imagine districts
165. See Alexander, supra note 13, at Al ("[T]he prevailing attitude [of the
community] seems to be that we would support this 100 percent if it were all
extracurricular activities, as opposed to singling out athletes."); Matthew
Futterman and Frederick Kunkle, High School Gridder Sacks Drug Testing, THE
STAR-LEDGER, September 25, 1998, at 25 (student athlete would not be opposed
to drug testing program if it had targeted all students); John Gibeaut, Who's
Raising the Kids, A.B.A. J., August 1997, at 62 (a majority of parents support
random drug testing of students); Elizabeth Gibson, Parents Voice Concern Over
Drug-Testing Plan, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, August 7, 1998, at B2 ("I just don't
want the athletes to feel... targeted," said a South Middletown parent regarding
proposed mandatory student athlete drug testing); Swinson, supra note 1, at Al
(South Middletown School Board member questioned a proposal to test only
athletes and not all students involved in extracurricular activities).
166. See Todd v. Rush County Schs., 139 F.3d 571, 573 (7th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 824 (1998) (stating with regard to the majority's decision to
uphold mandatory drug testing of all students involved in extracurricular activities
"[this] decision takes us a long way toward condoning drug testing in the general
school population.") (Ripple, J., dissenting); Gibeaut, supra note 19, at 42 (the
School Boards Association of New Jersey "has adopted a policy that supports drug
testing of all students"); Gibson, supra note 165, at B2 (parents wanted drug
testing of a general segment of the student population); Zemel, supra note 13, at
A-10 (Superintendent of Iroquois School District stated, "In a fair world, it would
be that everyone should be tested for drugs on a random basis.").
167. See Todd A. DeMitchell, Security Within the Schoolhouse Gate: An
Emerging Fundamental Value in Educational Policy Making, 120 WEST'S EDUC.
LAW R. 379, 386 n.49 (1997). A community drug task force pushed the White
Mountains Regional School Board in northern New England to adopt a policy
which included the random drug testing of all students, administrators, faculty,
secretaries, and custodians. See id. at 386.
168. See Schiavo, supra note 164, at B20. The School Board Director of the
Allentown School District proposed a policy that would require pre-employment
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zealously fighting the war on drugs by randomly testing members of
the Parent-Teacher Association. Parents play an important role in
the educational system. Since parents are often their children's best
teachers, they should be drug-free as well. 6 9 As is demonstrated,
school drug testing policies may be expanded to include almost
anyone associated with a school in an effort to cleanse the
educational system of drugs.
2. The Harmful Effects of Urinalysis.-The privacy interests
implicated by mandatory drug testing are far from minimal.
Producing urine is an intimate act that is generally limited to
performance in the seclusion of a bathroom.17 ° A majority of public
restrooms are segregated by gender and have stalls with doors that
lock in order to protect the privacy of the act.171 Most jurisdictions
prohibit, by law, urination in public.1 2 Beyond the intrusiveness of
forcing the act itself, urine may contain information concerning an
individual's life.1 73 "Ordering a person to empty his or her bladder
and produce the urine in a container for inspection.., is no less
offensive to personal dignity than requiring the individual to empty
his pockets74 and produce a report containing the results of
urinalysis."1
Drug testing by urinalysis is not comparable to urinating in a
public restroom.'
Self-conscious adolescents may find the
experience of urinalysis even more humiliating than adults
experiencing the same intrusion. 76 Many policies require students
drug tests for teachers and require drug testing for teachers and students who are
injured at school. See id.
169. Even if unintentional, parents teach children by example. See GARY I.
WADLER & BRIAN HAINLINE, DRUGS AND THE ATHLETE 25 (1989) (parental
reliance on drugs has been proposed as a "role-model coping mechanism" that
contributes to adolescent drug abuse) [hereinafter WADLER & HAINLINE]; Jeanne
E. Jenkins, The Influence of PeerAffiliation and Student Activities on Adolescent
Drug Involvement, ADOLESENCE, Summer 1996, at 297 (several studies have
shown a significant association between parenting practices, parental drug use, and
teenage drug use).
170. See In re Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Bd. of Educ., 510
N.E.2d 325, 329 (N.Y. 1987); Jeanette C. James, Note, The Constitutionality of
Federal Employee Drug Testing: National Treasury of Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 109, 116 (1988).
171. See James, supra note 170, at 116.
172. See id.
173. See Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers, 510 N.E.2d at 329.
Urinalysis shows evidence of drug use, venereal disease, pregnancy, epilepsy,
schitzoprenia, and sickle-cell anemia. See James, supra note 170, at 116.
174. Patchogue-MedfordCongress of Teachers, 510 N.E.2d at 330.
175. See supra note 155.
176. See Martin R. Gardner, Student Privacy in the Wake of T.L.O. - An Appeal
for an Individualized Suspicion Requirementfor Valid Searches and Seizures in the
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to be monitored audibly during urination.'7 Some require visual
Added to the
monitoring of a student during urination. 78'

embarrassment of being monitored, many students also experience
a great deal of stress during the testing process.179 Invasion of a
student's privacy interests may damage self-esteem and healthy
maturation into adulthood.' 8 The American Academy of Pediatrics

as a prerequisite for
condemns the use of involuntary drug testing
8
'
activities.
extracurricular
in
participation
3. Drug Testing May Not Be Working. -Random

drug testing

may not be as effective in combating the war on drugs as school
boards had hoped.'" Problems with the policies stem from looking

to Supreme Court precedent, and not at a district's own students,
when deciding who to test.

It appears that many districts have adopted polices, based not
upon evidence of drug problems among its athletes, but because
testing athletes has been accepted by the United States Supreme

Court.' 83 Evidence of a drug problem among athletes does not seem
to be necessary so long as testing athletes is constitutional."

In

Schools, 22 GA. L. REV. 897, 903 (1988). Three students forced to undergo
urinalysis stated that they were "extremely embarrassed and humiliated by the
test." Id. at 935. "[O]ne student. . . 'tried five, six, seven times,' 'every night after
school,' but could not urinate into the container because 'he was embarrassed to
do so."' Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095, 1100 (Colo. 1998).
177. See Carlynton Policy, supra note 21, at 9; Derry Policy, supra note 25, at 3.
178. See Carlynton Policy, supra note 21, at 9; Derry Policy, supra note 25, at 3.
179. See Samantha Elizabeth Shulter, Note, Random, Suspicionless Testing of
High School Athletes Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton 115, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1289, 1300 (1996). Stress may affect students so that they cannot
urinate for several hours subsequent to testing. See id.
180. See Gardner, supra note 176, at 901. Privacy is tied to dignity, self-respect,
and the right to be treated as a person. See id. at 905. Children's experiences with
privacy influence their self-esteem and become an illustration of independence and
self-knowledge. See id. at 901. Fostering an appreciation for privacy is part of an
education in American civic values and preparation for becoming a responsible
citizen. See id. at 902.
181. See American' Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Substance Abuse,
Testing For Drugs of Abuse in Children and Adolescents, PEDIATRICS, August
1996, at 308 [hereinafter Testing Adblescents].
182. The effect of polices are not easily determined because low numbers of
positive test results may indicate either the district does not have the drug problem
among athletes that it had thought or that the tests have been a successful
deterrent. See Swinson, supra note 20, at Al.
183. See Alexander, supra note 13, at Al (superintendent is aiming policy
strictly at athletes because of the Supreme Court decision); Swinson, supra note 1,
at Al (school board aimed drug testing only at athletes because they were told that
the Supreme Court decision applied specifically to athletes).
184. Prior to adopting a policy testing athletes for drugs, Gettysburg
Superintendent stated that the district did not have a serious drug problem. See
Gibson, supra note 165, at B2.
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addition, studies show that students not involved in school activities
tend to be those likely to turn to drugs.'85 On the contrary, athletes
may shy away from drugs because of the affect drugs can have on
their performance, especially if the student is serious about seeking
an athletic scholarship for college."l If a student is not involved in
athletics, then there is no chance that he or she will be tested, and
this student's problem will continue without remedy. Students can

also hide drug problems by intentionally avoiding participation in
school athletics.'87 Therefore, policies may actually discourage the
student who is vulnerable to drug abuse from pursuing the structure
and positive influence of an athletic program." Testing athletes for
drugs appears ineffective and harmful, in addition to being
unconstitutional. School boards have other tools available besides
random mandatory drug testing to fight the war on drugs in a
constitutional manner.
IV. Alternatives to Mandatory Suspicionless Drug Testing
Drug use has increased among teenagers both in Pennsylvania
Protecting students'
and nationwide throughout the 1990s.'89
constitutional rights and striking down random mandatory drug
testing of athletes would not leave school districts helpless in
combating the drug problem. Testing students for drugs based
185.

See

PAUL J. BROUNSTEIN, Et. Al., SUBSTANCE USE AND DELINQUENCY

AMONG INNER CITY ADOLESCENT MALES

52-56 (1990) (stating that those not

using drugs showed a higher interest in school and were involved in extracurricular
activities than those who used drugs) [hereinafter SUBSTANCE USE]; Testing
Adolescents, supra note 181, at 306 (involuntary drug screening of only athletes
does not promote good health); Jenkins, supra note 169, at 295 (drug use not as
prevalent among those involved in extracurricular activities); Swinson, supra note
20, at Al (one student commented that it appears that typically the better students
are the ones being tested).
186. See WALDLER & HAINLINE, supra note 169, at 27 (high school seniors with
aspirations of completing college have lower rates of drug abuse than those who do
not expect to complete college); Hardy, supra note 20, at Al ("You can't run up
and down a basketball court and do drugs, or perform as well... in football.").
187. See Schiavo, supra note 164, at B20 (Teacher stated that the school was
having a difficult time getting students to participate in extracurricular activities
and that testing would decrease participation in extracurricular activities and
athletics even more).
188. See Jenkins, supra note 169, at 295 (increasing students' attachments to
school through extracurricular activities and rewarding academic experiences leads
to a decrease in drug use); Gibson, supra note 165, at B2 (athletics may provide the
structure and goals needed to mature and resist peer pressure).
189. See DeMitchell, supra note 167, at 379; Telephone interview with Donna
Wedig, Administrative Assistant II with the Pennsylvania Department of Heath's
Bureau of Drug and Alcohol Programs (January. 8, 1999) (notes on file with
Dickinson Law Review).
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upon reasonable suspicion, coupled with drug prevention programs,
would be a constitutional step toward drug-free schoo.ls."
At least one district in Pennsylvania, Carlynton, tests its
students only when there is "reasonable cause" to believe the
student is under the influence of drugs. 9 ' The district follows
procedures similar to those used at schools that test athletes, the
only difference being who is chosen and how. 92 Carlynton's policy
involves constitutional testing of students since all that is required
to search an individual student under Article I, Section 8 is
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.193 Because students are under
constant supervision by teachers, administrators, and in some
schools, police officers, recognizing a student under the influence of
drugs should not be difficult.'94 This method of testing may be more
effective than the random testing of athletes. Because the policy
applies to all students, it deters the entire student body from using
drugs, not only those involved in athletics. Students can participate
in
extra-curricular
activities without
surrendering their
constitutional rights and can reap the benefits that are associated
with increased school involvement.9 5
In addition to testing, schools could institute drug prevention
programs. Some programs have reduced drug abuse among
students by 50 to 75% .96 One such program, called Life Skills,
coaches children on how to refuse an offer of drugs.'" The program
also teaches students strategies for problem solving, goal setting,
coping with stress, making friends, standing up for one's beliefs, and

190. Some districts in Pennsylvania have adopted voluntary drug testing
programs. See Justice, supra note 20, at A10. Presumably only those who are not
using drugs or who have not used drugs for several days would consent to be
tested. See Testing Adolescents, supra note 181, at 305. Therefore, voluntary
testing would not detect most drug users. See id.
191. See Carlynton Policy, supra note 21, at 1.
192- Compare Carlynton Policy, supra note 21, at 1 (any student is subject to
testing if there is reasonable cause to believe the student is under the influence of
drugs) with Middletown Policy, supra note 9, at 1 (all athletes subject to mandatory
random testing), and Derry Policy, supra note 25, at 1 (all athletes subject to
mandatory random testing).
193. See cases cited supra note 114.
194. Carlynton's policy sets forth what will be considered reasonable cause to
conduct a drug test: "odors, pupillary changes, slurred speech, lack of normal
coordination, or other observable behavior that is an indication of being under the
influence." Carlynton Policy, supra note 21, at 6.
195. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
196. See Warren Richey, Best Weapon in War on Drugs: Sixth Grade,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 19, 1997, at 1.
197. See id. at 7.
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recognizing the harmful messages that the media sends.9 To create
a drug-free environment, schools need to institute programs that
enhance children's self-esteem, rather than ingrain distrust and fear
through random chemical testing."
V.

Conclusion

Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution has been
"unshakably linked" to a right of individual privacy for over two

hundred years.2" Pennsylvania courts have not hesitated to extend

greater protection of privacy under the Pennsylvania Constitution
than that recognized under the Fourth Amendment.2 1
An
examination of Penn-sylvania's search and seizure clause illustrates

that random drug testing of student athletes is another area in
which Pennsylvania law separates from federal precedent.0 2

The

issue of student drug testing has not been addressed by other
jurisdictions under their state constitutions, and it is far from clear
that those jurisdictions will approve of urinalysis in public schools.
Fears about expansion of drug testing polices, evidence of the
harmful effects of urinalysis on children, and doubts concerning the
effectiveness of existing policies all support protection of students'

rights under Article I, Section 8.24 Finally, alternative programs,
including testing for drugs based upon reasonable suspicion of drug
use, are available to school districts in the quest for drug-free

schools.
Carving out an exception for student athletes and
denying them the protection that Article I, Section 8 provides is a
civics lesson in itself. Today's students, and Pennsylvania's future
198. See id.
199. See SUBSTANCE USE, supra note 185, at 4 (teenagers who abuse drugs tend
to have relatively low self-esteem); Gardner, supra note 176, at 901 (threats to
students' privacy "[function as] threats to self-esteem").
200. See cases cited supra note 61.
201. See sources cited supra note 64.
202. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. In a footnote in Commonwealth v.
Mason, the court discussed the differences between federal and Pennsylvania
search and seizure law:
The ultimate distinction, then between federal and the Pennsylvania
analysis is not that the federal courts seek only to deter police misconduct
and the Pennsylvania courts seek to protect certain rights, but that the
federal courts place less importance than do we on the right of privacy.
Therefore, they balance interests differently and reach a different
conclusion as to the relative importance of privacy against securing
criminal convictions.
637 A.2d 251, 257 (Pa. 1993).
203. See supra Part III.C.
204. See discussion supra Part III.D.
205. See supra Part IV.
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leaders, are learning that the rights of a few may be ignored if the
governing authority has a good enough reason.
Amanda L. Harrison

